分析师跟踪是否抑制了企业避税?——基于外部公司治理的视角  

Does Analysts Tracking Curb the Corporate Tax Avoidance?——From the Perspective of External Corporate Governance

作　　者：汤泰劼 宋献中 罗曼璐 TANG Tai-jie;SONG Xian-zhong;LUO Man-lu

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871 [2]暨南大学管理学院/广州区域低碳经济研究基地,广州510632 [3]北京龙湖中佰置业有限公司,北京100029

出　　处：《财务研究》2018年第5期28-39,共12页Finance Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(16ZZD049)

摘　　要：本文基于信息不对称理论,研究卖方分析师作为外部公司治理的有效组成部分,是否能够有效抑制企业避税行为。实证检验发现:分析师跟踪显著抑制了企业避税行为。在考虑分析师跟踪上市公司存在的自选择内生性后,本文通过运用分析师所处券商与上市公司之间的距离作为工具变量进行二阶段回归后发现,证券分析师作为信息中介,以其专业知识及发布分析报告缓解了投资者与上市公司间的信息不对称,外部治理提升了企业避税的实施成本,从而抑制了企业避税。进一步研究发现:分析师跟踪与各地税务机关税收征管力度呈现显著的互补效应。本文的研究一定程度上丰富了分析师外部治理的文献,同时也从分析师跟踪与税收征管的双重视角发现了对企业避税抑制作用的潜在途径。Based on the theory of information asymmetry, this paper studies whether the seller analysts can effectively curb corporate tax avoidance as a form of external governance. The empirical test finds that analysts tracking significantly reduce corporate tax avoidance. Considering the endogenous of self-selection between analysts tracking and those listed companies, this paper utilizes the distance between brokers and listed companies as instrumental variable, and finds those analysts perform as information agents who use the knowledge and reports to alleviate the information asymmetry between outside investors and listed companies. With the alleviation of information asymmetry, the cost of corporate tax avoidance can be increased and the corporate tax avoidance can be reduced. Further research finds that analysts tracking and the extent of tax collection and administration have a significant complementary effect. Our research not only enriches the literature of analysts＇ external governance, but also finds the potential ways to reduce corporate tax avoidance from the dual perspectives of analysts tracking and tax collection and administration.

关 键 词：分析师跟踪 企业避税 外部治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]