基于不确定演化博弈的绿色供应链中政府与核心企业关系研究  

The Relationship between the Government and the Core Enterprise in the Green Supply Chain Based on Uncertain Evolution Game

作　　者：李方超 黄冰冰 LI Fang-chao;HUANG Bing-bing(School of Economics ＆ Commence Guangdong University of Technology Guangzhou 510520 China;School of Economics ＆ Trade,Guangdong University of Finance,Guangzhou 510521,China)

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学经济与贸易学院,广州510520 [2]广东金融学院经济贸易学院,广州510521

出　　处：《价值工程》2018年第33期95-98,共4页Value Engineering

基　　金：广东工业大学研究生创新项目(262523758)

摘　　要：为使绿色供应链中政府与核心企业的博弈过程更具有实际意义,本文以政府与核心企业分别采取不同策略的收益与成本为基础,先是回顾了确定性演化博弈模型研究的政府与企业之间的博弈关系,博弈结果表明:政府对企业是否开展绿色供应链管理的奖惩力度、核心企业开展绿色供应链管理的成本和收益,都直接影响博弈结果,政府和核心企业双方的博弈过程存在三个演化稳定策略。然后重点将在确定性演化博弈模型中考虑了更多的不确定影响因素,得到不确定演化博弈模型。在对双方不确定演化博弈过程分析后得到一个演化稳定策略,研究发现政府应积极向企业提供环保信息和技术支持,使其在市场上更具竞争力,企业将会自觉采取绿色供应链管理。In order to make the game process between the government and the core enterprise in the green supply chain more practical, bases on the benefits and costs of different strategies adopted by the government and the core enterprises, firstly, this paper reviews the game relationship between the government and the enterprise of the deterministic evolutionary game model. The game relationship shows that the government＇s reward and punishment for the green supply chain management and the cost and benefit of the core enterprise＇s green supply chain management directly affect the game results and there are three evolutionary stability strategies in game process between the government and the core enterprises. Then the paper considers more uncertain influencing factors in the deterministic evolutionary game model, and obtains the uncertain evolutionary game model. After analyzing the uncertain evolutionary game process of both parties, an evolutionary stability strategy is obtained. The study finds that the government should actively provide environmental information and technical support to enterprises to make them more competitive in the market, and enterprises will consciously adopt green supply chain management.

关 键 词：绿色供应链管理 不确定演化博弈 不确定性演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]