地方政府竞争与“扶持之手”的选择  

Local Govemment Competition and the Choice of ‘Supponing Hands’

作　　者：鄢波 王华[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东海洋大学管理学院 [2]广东财经大学

出　　处：《宏观经济研究》2018年第9期85-97,108,共14页Macroeconomics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“社会资本视域下的中国上市公司亏损逆转质量:结构特征、驱动机理与经济后果”(批准号:71572153);国家社会科学基金项目“亏损上市公司治理效率与扭亏行为的市场反应研究”(批准号:13CGL050);重庆市社会科学规划项目(批准号:2017YBGL159);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目重大培育项目(批准号:SWU1709201);广东海洋大学博土启动项目“政府补助、盈余管理与扭亏行为的经济后果”(批准号:15175)的资助

摘　　要：地方政府为获得政治晋升，围绕经济目标展开了排位竞争，竞争压力必然影响地方政府对经济的干预。本文研究了地方政府竞争压力耐上市公司获得政府补助的影响，研究表明地方政府在竞争压力下理性地选择了扶持对象和扶持力度。竞争压力大的地方政府对地方上市公司的扶持力度和扶持意愿更大，竞争压力小的地方政府会减弱对上市公司的扶持力度，基于“壳”资源的稀缺地方政府对财务困境公司的扶持力度具有刚性特征，对业绩好的盈利公司的扶持则随着竞争压力呈现出差异化特征。本文的研究有助于对政府“扶持之手”的行为决策的理解，为政府干预行为的规范治理提供经验证据。In order to obtain political advance- ment,local governments have started ranking com- petition around economic goals, and competition pressure will inevitably affect the local govern- ment＇ s intervention in the economy. This paper studies the influence of local government competi- tion pressure on the listed companies＇ obtaining government subsidies. The study shows that local governments rationally choose the support targets and support efforts under competitive pressure. Local governments with large competitive pressures have greater support and willingness to support the local listed companies. Local governments with less competitive pressure will weaken their support for listed companies. Based on the scarcity of ‘shell＇ resources, local governments support the financial distress companies. With rigid characteristics, the support for profitable companies with good per- formance will show differentiation characteristics with competitive pressure. The study in this paper helps to understand the government＇s ‘supporting hand＇ behavioral decision and provides empirical evidence for the standard governance of government intervention.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 扶持之手 政府补助 财务困境 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]