基于零售商延保服务的竞争供应链销售回扣合同  

Sales-rebate contract for competing supply chains with retailers' extended warranty services

作　　者：马建华[1] 艾兴政[2] 赵海霞[3] 李晓静[2] Ma Jianhua;Ai Xingzheng;Zhao Haixia;Li Xiaojing(College of Management,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518060,China;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 610054,China;School of Management and Economics,Southwest Petroleum University,Chengdu 610500,China)

机构地区：[1]深圳大学管理学院,广东深圳518060 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054 [3]西南石油大学经济管理学院,四川成都610500

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2018年第4期520-535,共16页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372140; 71402101; 71402102)

摘　　要：构建两个制造商和两个排他性零售商组成的链与链价格竞争模型,其中零售商提供有偿延保服务.每条供应链拥有两个纵向合同选择策略:批发价格合同和销售回扣合同.基于制造商和零售商利润双赢的角度,研究销售回扣合同的占优性条件和设计机制,揭示零售商延保和市场竞争对销售回扣合同选择策略的影响.研究表明,当市场竞争强度低于严重依赖于延保期的特定阈值时,设置销售回扣合同参数在合理范围内,则将形成两条供应链同时采用销售回扣合同的占优策略均衡,该均衡实现业界所有制造商和零售商利润Pareto改进.This paper constructs a chain-to-chain price competition model consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers, where the retailers provide pay-needed extended warranty services. Each supply chain has two types of vertical contract strategy options： Either a wholesale price or a sales-rebate contract. The research aims to study the dominant conditions and design mechanism for sales-rebate contract under which both the manufacturer and the retailer can be better off, and to reveal how the retailers＇ extended warranties and market competition affect the choice of sales-rebate contracts. The results show that when market competition is lower than a certain threshold which depends on extended warranty length significantly, and when the sales- rebate parameters are set in a rational range, both supply chains conducting the sales-rebate contract are the dominant strategy equilibrium which profits all members in the industry.

关 键 词：零售商延保 竞争供应链 销售回扣合同 渠道管理 协调 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]