考虑乘客策略行为的航空客运定价策略与中介商销售机制研究  

The Pricing Strategy and Intermediary Selling Mechanism for Airline with Strategic Passengers Behavior

作　　者：李豪 陈春洋[2] 邹柳馨 LI Hao;CHEN Chunyang;ZOU Liuxin(School of Economics and Management;School of Traffic and Transportation,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074 [2]重庆交通大学交通运输学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《工业工程》2018年第5期24-30,49,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402012);重庆市教委自然科学基金(KJ130402)

摘　　要：研究了航空公司引入中介商销售机制时的动态定价策略及该机制缓解乘客策略行为的效果。在乘客具有策略行为且估价服从均匀分布的情况下,通过建立航空公司和销售中介的两周期动态博弈模型,分析了二者的均衡定价策略,从收益的角度探讨了中介商销售机制的有效性。研究表明:当乘客对中介商的估价折扣位于某一范围时,中介商销售机制可以缓解乘客的策略行为对航空公司收益的影响,且具有实施的可行性。最后应用算例验证了理论分析结果,同时发现:中介商销售机制不能完全弥补乘客策略行为带来的损失;航空公司和中介商一定程度的竞争可能带来更高的收益。The dynamic pricing strategy for airline tickets through intermediary selling mechanism is investigated when the passengers are strategic and their valuation follows a Uniform distribution, and the effectiveness of the intermediary selling to alleviate strategic behavior is analyzed. The equilibrium price for both the airline and intermediary is proved by introducing a two-period dynamic pricing model, and the effectiveness of the intermediary selling from the point of revenue is discussed. It is concluded that when the discount factor for intermediary is located in a certain range, the intermediary selling mechanism can alleviate strategic behavior and have the feasibility to implement. Through numerical examples, the results of theoretical analysis is verified, and it is also found that intermediary selling mechanism cannot completely eliminate the passenger strategic behavior, and a certain level of competition between the airline and the intermediary may bring more revenue.

关 键 词：动态定价 策略行为 中介商销售 估价不确定 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]