对实验哲学与传统哲学之争的考察  

On the Debate between Experimental and Traditional Philosophy

作　　者：张子夏 余雅晶[2] 伍素 

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学哲学系,南京210023 [2]义乌工商职业技术学院,义乌322000 [3]中山大学哲学系,广州510275

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2018年第10期95-101,共7页Zhejiang Social Sciences

摘　　要：实验哲学力图在批判传统哲学实践的基础上重新思考哲学方法,并因此引发了一系列元哲学问题上的争论。然而由于未能明确问题的焦点何在,争论双方陷入了自说自话的窘境。为解决该问题,我们必须通过考察相关概念的清晰程度以及哲学实践的实际情况来得出关于实验哲学的攻击目标及其正当性的结论。由分析可知,实验哲学矛头所指的对象当中,当代扶椅哲学因其运作方式的自然化转向而难以成为攻击目标,哲学家进行思想实验的正当性则取决于哲学家是否能以直觉为证据。直觉又可分为表面直觉和健全直觉。由于传统哲学家也倾向于拒绝将表面直觉作为证据,因此这场争论的问题应聚焦于健全直觉能否被用作证据。Experimental philosophy aims at establishing a new philosophical method by criticizing traditional philosophical practice. This move gives rise to a series of meta-philosophical debates. However, both sides of the debates keep begging their opponents' questions and it largely due to the confusion of different focuses. To solve this problem, one should articulate some core concepts and investigate how philosophical practices take place to identify at what experimental philosophy really targets and to what extent it is justified. According to our analyses, there are three supposed targets: armchair philosophy, thought experiments, and philosophers' uses of intuitions. Contemporary armchair philosophy is innocent because of the naturalistic turn; the justificatory status of thought experiments depends on whether it is legitimate forphilosopher to take intuitions as evidence. But one should distinguish between surface and robust intuitions.Traditional philosophers also tend to refuting surface intuitions as evidence. Therefore, the focus of this debate is whether robust intuitions could be used as evidence.

关 键 词：实验哲学 扶椅哲学 思想实验 直觉 证据 

分 类 号：B08[哲学宗教—哲学理论]