最后要价仲裁机制模型的纳什均衡分析  

The Analysis of Nash Equilibrium on Final-offer Arbitration Model

作　　者：冯晶晶[1] 胡艳[1] FENG Jingjing;HU Yan(School of Intelligent Science and Information Engineering,Xi＇an Peihua University,Xi＇an 710125,China)

机构地区：[1]西安培华学院智能科学与信息工程学院,陕西西安710125

出　　处：《杭州师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2018年第6期637-640,共4页Journal of Hangzhou Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(61473239);西安培华学院校级科研项目(PHKT18067)

摘　　要：运用最后要价仲裁机制模型,以交通事故赔偿为例,对赔偿问题作了模型描述,给出了在最后要价仲裁模型下交通事故赔偿问题的纳什均衡求解方法.并在指数分布和均匀分布的条件下给出最后要价仲裁机制模型的纳什均衡解,使争议双方理性地判断仲裁者的偏好方案,从而获得更好的收益.Taking the traffic accident compensation as the example, this paper carries out the modeling description with the final-offer arbitration model. The Nash equilibrium solution for the traffic accident compensation is analyzed in the final-offer arbitration model. The Nash equilibrium solution for the final-offer arbitration model is given under the exponential distribution and uniform distribution, and the high-yielding is obtained by the parties to the dispute rationally.

关 键 词：最后要价仲裁 纳什均衡 指数分布 均匀分布 

分 类 号：O29[理学—应用数学] F224.32[理学—数学]