媒体负面报道、分析师跟踪与税收激进度  

Negative Media Coverage,Analyst Following and Tax Aggressiveness

作　　者：刘笑霞[1] 李明辉[2] Liu Xiaoxia;Li Minghui

机构地区：[1]河海大学会计学系,211100 [2]南京大学会计学系,210093

出　　处：《会计研究》2018年第9期64-71,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71602047);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2017ZDIXM069);财政部"全国会计领军(后备)人才(学术类)培养项目"资助

摘　　要：本文利用中国A股非金融类上市公司2008-2015年数据,考察了媒体负面报道和分析师跟踪对公司避税行为的影响,结果发现,无论是负面报道还是分析师跟踪,都会抑制公司的税收激进度,这一结果拒绝了市场压力假说,而与信息中介和公司治理假说一致。结果还表明,负面报道与分析师跟踪之间是互补关系。此外,国有产权、地区税收征管强度可以增强负面报道对税收激进度的抑制作用,但对分析师跟踪与税收激进度之间的关系没有显著调节作用。Using the data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2015, this paper investigates the effect of negative media coverage and analyst following on corporate tax avoidance. The results show that both negative media coverage and analyst following can significantly re- strain aggressive tax avoidance. Above results support the information intermediary and corporate governance hypothesis and reject the market pressure hy- pothesis. And there is a complementary relationship between negative media coverage and analyst following. Further tests show that both state property rights and the strength of regional tax enforcement can enhance the negative effect of negative media coverage on tax aggressiveness, but above two factors have no significant moderating effects on the association between analyst following and tax aggressiveness.

关 键 词：媒体负面报道 分析师跟踪 税收激进度 信息中介 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275.4[经济管理—企业管理] G206[经济管理—国民经济]