劳动共享的裁员机制与合谋  

Downsizing with Labor Sharing and Collusion

作　　者：安东尼奥.易斯塔什 让-雅克.拉丰 张昕竹[3] 

机构地区：[1]世界银行学院 [2]法国图鲁兹大学 [3]中国社会科学院规制与竞争研究中心

出　　处：《世界经济》2002年第9期3-14,共12页The Journal of World Economy

摘　　要：本文构造一个以国有企业工人在私有部门的生产率为逆向选择变量的模型 ,分析国有企业的最优裁员政策。此外 ,模型还利用一个代表国有部门内的生产力参数来区分工人。分析结果表明 ,对应于最优裁员机制的劳动力重新配置依赖于工人在公共部门和私有部门的比较优势 ,还取决于信息不对称的程度 ,如果信息不对称程度很小 ,那么随机裁员机制可能成为最优机制 ;如果信息不对称足够严重 ,工人与负责裁员的经理之间的合谋可能导致比不存在合谋时更多的筛选 ;最后 ,我们研究了工人对风险的厌恶如何影响最优裁员机制。In this paper we develop a model with adverse selection on the productive efficiency of workers in the private sector to analyze the downsizing problem in a public enterprise. In addition, workers are also distinguished by an inside productivity factor. Our result shows that the reallocation of labor in the optimal downsizing mechanism depends on the comparative advantage of workers in public versus private production and on the size of asymmetric information. In particular, if the information asymmetry is small, random downsizing mechanisms may become optimal. We also show that collusion between workers and the managers in charge of downsizing may induce more screening than in the absence of collusion if the information asymmetry is large enough. Finally, we study how risk aversion of workers affects the optimal downsizing mechanism.

关 键 词：裁员机制 中国 国有企业 劳动效率 人事制度 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]