关于经理人股票期权会计确认问题的研究  

Study on the Accounting Recognition of Executive Stock Options

作　　者：谢德仁[1] 刘文[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,100084

出　　处：《会计研究》2002年第9期25-30,24,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 (批准号为 70 0 72 0 12 )的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文对经理人股票期权会计确认问题进行了较深入的研究。本文提出 ,按照现代企业理论 ,经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享 ,行权前的经理人成为企业的非股东所有者。因此 ,应将股票期权确认为企业的利润分配 ,而非美国现行的确认为费用之处理 ,以反映经理人股票期权的经济实质。这样 ,股票期权的会计处理将不影响利润表 ,从而也更有助于推动用公允价值法计量之 ,以更科学地反映其价值。为此 ,应革新现行的财务会计观念与模式 ,建立非股东所有者的新概念 ,使之适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。This paper is to study the accounting recognition of Executive Stock Options (ESO). After deep discussion, the paper draws the following conclusions: according to the modern theory of the firm, the economic nature of ESO is executives' sharing of claim to firm's residue. Before the executives exercise the options, they become firms' non-shareholder owners. Thus, in order to reflect the economic nature of ESO, it should be recognized as firms' profit distribution rather than as expense, which is currently the accounting practice in America. As the result, the accounting for ESO would not affect the income statement, this would contribute to measuring the ESO by the fair value method, which reflects the value of ESO more reasonably. Therefore, in order to adapt to the business environment where executives participate in the sharing of claim to firm's residue, the current financial accounting concepts and model should be reformed, and the new concept of non-shareholder owners should be built.

关 键 词：经理人股票期权 企业剩余索取权 利润分配 会计确认 公允价值 会计计量 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]