业主自治的可能性:基于复制动态的合作均衡条件  

The Possibility of Owner Self-government in Urban Community:Conditions of Cooperative Equilibrium Based on Replicator Dynamics

作　　者：朱宪辰[1] 章平 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学应用经济研究所

出　　处：《制度经济学研究》2005年第3期132-152,共21页Research on Institutional Economics

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究指导项目<全面小康建设中社区共有稀缺资源治理研究>的资助(编号:03SJD790002)

摘　　要：城镇住宅小区共享资源治理如何走出困境?政府强制性供给,还是业主自治?在已有相关研究和方法基础上,本文对比了经典博弈论中囚徒困境博弈的重复博弈合作解(无名氏定理)和序贯博弈合作解的产生,运用演化动力学模型,分析个体策略稳定收敛,证明了城镇住宅小区共享资源业主自治合作均衡的存在性,并给出其收敛条件;依次解释个体合作行为发生和维持特征,如信息和预期调整、报复动力、社会资本。并分析了近年出台的城镇住宅小区物业管理法规的必要性。How can we walk out of the dilemmas of the government of urban community?Government provided or owner self-government?Based on a summary about concerned research and theoretical methods,this paper explores the stable conditions on which selection will operate for altruistic trait and the institution of voluntary contributed common resource will happen,using evolutionary dynamical model for reference.Then we demonstrate the existence of owner self-government as a cooperative equilibrium in urban community.Finally,the article interprets the characteristics of the cooperative behavior,such as the viability of vengeance and social capital.And then we argue that there is no necessity of so much legislation about governance of common resource in Urban Community.

关 键 词：复制动态 业主自治 合作均衡 

分 类 号：F293.33[经济管理—国民经济] F224