基金经理人激励约束机制的动态博弈分析——基于声誉机制视角  

Research on the Dynamic Game Theory of Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms of Fund Managers——Based on the Perspective of Reputation Mechanism

作　　者：何媛媛[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学统计与数学学院

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》2011年第5期94-100,共7页Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

摘　　要：在显性激励契约下,作为物质激励的股权、基金管理费和契约合同等显性激励机制起到基本保障作用,但在基金的实际操作中以及通过多阶段动态模型博弈可以看出,显性的契约激励机制可能在一定程度上失效。基金经理人不仅要考虑当期报酬最大化,更要考虑上期业绩、声誉对下期报酬的影响,以最大化其长期利益。因此作为精神激励的隐性激励机制,声誉效应更能有效规范基金经理人的投资行为。In the dominant incentive contract,as the material incentives,the stock right,fund management fees,lease contracts and other explicit incentives play a fundamental safeguarding role.But in the fund’s actual operation and through multi-stage dynamic game model,the dominant contract incentives may fail to some extent.In order to maximize long-term interests,fund managers should not only consider maximizing the current pay,but also pay more attention to the influence of the last phase achievement and reputation on the next phase remuneration.Therefore,as the invisible spiritual motivation,reputation can effectively regulate the fund manager’s investment behavior.

关 键 词：显性契约激励机制 声誉效应 基金经理人 基金公司 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.39[经济管理—国民经济] F224