关于一类风险投资的动态博弈模型及分析  

A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors

作　　者：麦均洪[1] MAI Jun-hong(Institute of Financial Engineering, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou Guangdong 510640, China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学金融工程中心,广东广州510640

出　　处：《控制理论与应用》2016年第8期1105-1110,共6页Control Theory & Applications

摘　　要："套牢"是在各类投资行为里广泛存在的问题.本文以高新技术企业和风险投资机构之间的合作研发行为为基础,基于不完全契约理论的建模方法,在动态博弈的框架内引入讨价还价因子对其中的"套牢"问题进行了分析.研究结果表明,讨价还价能力是影响是否存在研发激励不足问题的一个重要因素,在不受到有限责任约束的情形下,如果高新技术企业讨价还价能力更强,对其研发激励也更强,而在受到有限责任约束时,高新技术企业在研发阶段的投资激励则随其讨价还价能力的增强而减弱.最后通过一个算例对所得到的结论进行了检验.The hold-up problem is an interesting issue in incomplete contract theory for different kinds of investment behaviors. It has been agreed that hold-up would result of insufficient investment. For the cooperative R & D between high-tech companies and venture investor, this paper builds a dynamic game model which includes the bargaining power to analyze the hold-problem. The analysis results imply that bargaining power between high-tech companies and venture investor is an important factor and affect the invest incentive of high-tech companies. If there has no limited liability constraint,investment incentive will increase with the high-tech companies’ bargaining power, otherwise investment incentive will decrease with the high-tech companies’ bargaining power. Finally, the results are verified by a specific example.

关 键 词：不完全契约 套牢 讨价还价 有限责任约束 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F276.44[经济管理—企业管理] F832.39[经济管理—国民经济]