两权分离度、信息不对称与债务融资选择——基于中国民营上市公司的样本分析  

The Control-Ownership Wedge,Information Asymmetry and Debt Financing——Based on the Sample Analysis of Chinese Private Listed Companies

作　　者：孙蓓[1] 彭珏[1] Sun Bei;Peng Jue(College of Economics & Management, Southwest University)

机构地区：[1]西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《当代金融研究》2017年第2期57-68,共12页Journal of Contemporary Financial Research

摘　　要：本文主要探讨了我国民营上市公司终极控制人的两权分离程度与银行借款和公开发债选择之间的关系,以2011-2015年我国民营上市公司的面板数据为样本,利用多元回归分析方法进行研究。结果表明两权分离程度越大,公司进行债务融资时越倾向于银行借款;当信息不对称程度越低、信息透明程度越高时,公司倾向于选择公开发债,两权分离程度较大导致的代理问题也会得到弱化。结论符合有效市场理论。This paper mainly discusses the control-ownership wedge of private listed companies in China andthe choice between bank debt and public debt.The article takes China's private listed companies panel data as sampleand uses multiple regression analysis.The study found that the greater the degree of the control-ownership wedge,corporate debt financing more inclined to bank loans;when the information asymmetry is lower and the informationtransparency is higher,companies tend to choose public bonds,the agency problems caused by a larger degree of thecontrol-ownership wedge will be weakened.The conclusion is consistent with the efficient market theory.

关 键 词：两权分离 债务融资 银行借款 公开债券 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F276.5[经济管理—国民经济]