股权激励与公司业绩关系研究——基于盈余管理对公司业绩修饰的视角  

Based on the surplus management of the company's performance modified perspectives of study on the relationship between the equity incentive and firm performance

作　　者：罗婷[1] 何云[1] Luo Ting;He Yun(Sichuan normal university business school Sichuan chengdu 610101)

机构地区：[1]四川师范大学商学院,四川成都610101

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报（综合版）》2017年第3期68-74,共7页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business(Comprehensive Edition)

摘　　要：以2012—2014年沪深两市全部A股上市公司为研究样本,分析股权激励与公司业绩之间关系,并进一步区分不同产权性质下股权激励对公司业绩的影响程度。研究发现:在未剔除盈余管理对公司业绩修饰情况下,股权激励与公司业绩正相关,而且相较于国有企业,非国有企业管理层股权激励对公司业绩有更为明显的正向提升作用;在剔除盈余管理对公司业绩修饰情况下,股权激励与公司业绩关系由正相关转变为负相关,且与国有企业相比,非国有企业在剔除盈余管理修饰后,股权激励对公司业绩有更为明显的负向影响。Based on the all a-share listed companies as research samples of Shanghai and shenzhen from2012to2014,analyzing the relation between equity incentive and corporate performance,distinguishing the equity incentive effect on firm performance under different nature of property rights.Study found that if not eliminate earnings management on firm performance modification cases,the equity incentive and corporate performance are positive correlation,compared with the state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises management equity incentive has more obvious positive promotion effect to the company's performance;after stripping out earnings management on corporate performance modification cases,the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance by positive correlation into negative correlation,and compared with the state-owned enterprises,after modification,the non-state enterprises in eliminating surplus management equity incentive has more obvious negative effect on firm performance.

关 键 词：股权激励 盈余管理 公司业绩 国有企业 利益趋同假说 防御假说 现金激励 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]