意识科学中自我的建构论:超越实体论与错觉论之争  

Construction Theory of Self in Consciousness Science :Beyond the Debate of Substance Theory and Illusion Theory

作　　者：张静[1] 陈巍[2] ZHANG Jing;CHEN Wei(Institute of Psychological Health, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018, China;Center for the Study of Social Behavior and Developmental Science, Shaoxing Universily, Shaoxing Zhejiang,312000, China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学心理健康研究所,浙江杭州310018 [2]绍兴文理学院社会行为与发展科学研究中心,浙江绍兴312000

出　　处：《苏州大学学报（教育科学版）》2017年第3期12-23,共12页Journal of Soochow University(Educational Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金"自我错觉对自我的审视--基于虚拟现实技术的研究"(项目编号:17YJCZH243);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"认知哲学研究"(项目编号:13JZD004)的阶段性研究成果;国家社会科学基金重大项目"认知科学对哲学的挑战--心灵与认知哲学重大理论问题研究"(项目编号:11&ZD187)

摘　　要：自我在我们所亲熟的日常体验中总是被觉知为一个统一、独立和同一的极点式的自主体。从Descartes开始至今的自我实体论的拥护者,对于一种单一、独立和实在的实体自我的论证与寻找几乎从未停止过。然而,另一方面,神经科学从未在人脑中找到充当这种实体自我角色的脑结构,这导致有些研究者开始质疑自我的实在性,有的甚至认为所谓的实体自我无非是脑创造的一种错觉。自我的建构论者在同时反对这两种极端观点的基础上指出,自我是一个"我正在持续进行"(I-ing)的过程,正是这个过程生成了一个"我",并且在这个过程中"我"和过程本身是等同的。自我就是在这个过程中被建构起来的。In our personal daily experience,we perceive our self as a unitary independent polarized subject and we are the owner and initiator of our bodily experience and actions.From Descartes to the advocators of the substance theory of the self,there have been constant efforts trying to find or prove the existence of a real unitary independent substantial self.In contrast,the inability to find a particular neural substrate of the self has tempted some researchers to doubt the existence of a self and some even suggest that the so-called sense of self is a complete illusion.Researchers who support constructivism of the self criticize both extreme views and point out that the self is neither a thing or an entity nor an illusion,but may rather be a process.It is an ongoing process that enacts an“I”and in which the“I”is no different from this process itself.

关 键 词：实体论 错觉论 建构论 拥有感 自主感 

分 类 号：B842.7[哲学宗教—基础心理学]