官员晋升激励与地方教育支出行为——基于浙江省县级面板数据的实证研究  

Incentive for Official's Promotion and Local Education Expenditure Behavior:An Empirical Study Based on Chinese County-level Panel Data of Zhejiang Province(2000-2013)

作　　者：江依妮[1] 易雯[1] 梁梓然 Yini Jiang;Wen Yi;Ziran Liang(School of International Relationship and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai, China, 200433;School of Public Affairs, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian, China, 361005)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院,上海200433 [2]厦门大学公共事务学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《教育与经济》2017年第6期38-44,共7页Education & Economy

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金第61批面上资助项目"财政分权;地方政府支出偏好与公共服务满意度研究"(项目编号:2017M611430);国家社会科学基金重大项目"中国基本公共服务供给侧改革与获得感提升研究"(项目编号:16ZDA081)

摘　　要：基于中国的财政预算体制和人事干部管理体制,本文构建了一个晋升激励影响下的地方官员教育支出行为的研究模型。通过2000-2013年浙江省县级面板数据分析发现,经济导向的晋升考核某种程度影响着地方教育支出,不同特征的县级地方官员对当地教育支出影响不同。与官员升迁密切相关的官员年龄与地方教育支出呈正相关关系,官员任期并未给教育支出带来消极影响,而地方财政自主是影响县级政府教育支出的积极因素。Based on the finance budget system and cadre management system of China,this research constructs an empirical model of the local official’s education expenditure behavior,which is affected by promotion incentive.According to the analysis of the county-level panel data of Zhejiang province from2000to2013,the results reveal that the GDPoriented local official leaders’political promotion incentive mechanism has made some impacts on local education expenditure in a certain degree and the county magistrates with different characteristics have diverse influences on the local education expenditure.What’s more,the age of the local leader which is an important impact factor on political promotion,has a positive correlation with local education expenditure,while the tenure of the leaders has no negative impact on local education expenditure.However,the financial autonomy of the local is a positive factor that has influence on the education expenditure of the county-level government.

关 键 词：地方官员 晋升激励 教育支出 

分 类 号：F08[经济管理—政治经济学] G40-054[文化科学—教育学原理]