水域污染控制的微分博弈研究  

A Differential Game of Water Pollution Control

作　　者：易永锡[1] 许荣伟[1] 赵曼[1] 程粟粟 邹伟光 YI Yong xi;XU Rong wei;ZHAO Man;CHENG Li li;ZOU Wei guang(University of South China,Hengyang 421001,China)

机构地区：[1]南华大学经济管理学院,湖南衡阳421001

出　　处：《南华大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第5期79-85,共7页Journal of University of South China(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"中国低碳城市试点的政策绩效评价及优化研究"资助(编号:15CJY037);湖南省哲学社会科学基金项目"环境规制的绿色创新激励效应及其优化选择研究"资助(编号:16YBA315);湖南省研究生科研创新项目"基于排污权交易的湘江流域跨界水污染控制策略研究"资助(编号:CX2017B511)

摘　　要：排污权交易制度是一项行之有效的环境污染控制政策。文章运用微分博弈理论建立某水域两个企业水污染物排放控制的微分博弈模型,以两个企业的瞬时排污量为控制变量,以共同水域的污染物存量为状态变量,分析了独立决策和联合决策两种模式下的博弈策略。独立决策模式下两企业追求自身利益最大化,联合决策模式下追求总体利益最大化,运用动态最优化理论和方法,求出两种决策模式下的马尔科夫纳什均衡策略,并对结果进行比较分析。结果表明,两企业采取联合决策要比独立决策时能够实现更低的排污量、更低的污染物存量。Emission trading system is an effective policy of environmental pollution control.A pollution control differential game model is established by using differential game theory and method based on the horizontal transboundary pollution of two companies:with the instantaneous emissions as a control variable and the common water pollutants stock as state variables,it analyzes the independent decision making model of the enterprises in pursuit of maximizing their own interests,control strategy of joint decision model under the pursuit of the overall benefit maximization.By using the dynamic optimization method,the Markov Nash equilibrium strategy of the two decision making models are obtained.The results show that,compared with the independent decision making model,the joint decision making model can achieve lower emissions,lower pollution stock.At the same time,the equilibrium strategy will be affected by the price and the initial allocation of emission rights.

关 键 词：排污权交易 微分博弈 动态最优化 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]