客户关系型交易、权力配置与经理人薪酬契约  

Customer-based Transaction,Power Allocation and Executive Compensation Contract

作　　者：赵秀云[1] 周晨 ZHAO Xiu-yun;ZHOU Chen(School of Business,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China;School of Business,Shandong University of Political Science and Law,Jinan 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222 [2]山东政法学院商学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2018年第2期146-153,共8页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(16CGL013);天津市哲学社会科学基金项目(TJYY16-009)

摘　　要：文章以2008-2015年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证考察了客户关系型交易对经理人薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,客户关系型交易显著提升经理人薪酬水平的同时,也降低了经理人薪酬业绩敏感性程度。进一步发现,国有企业中,权力配置通过非货币薪酬激励机制能够抑制客户关系型交易影响经理人薪酬契约的权力寻租行为,而在民营企业中,权力配置不具有显著的治理作用。The paper,using A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2015 as samples,empirically examines the effect of customer-based transaction on executive compensation contract.The study shows that customer-based transaction both has a significant positive effect on the level of executive compensation,and results in the mitigation of the pay-performance sensitivity.Furthermore,the study also finds that power allocation through non monetary incentive mechanism can help restrain the effect of customer-based transaction on the power rent-seeking behavior of executive compensation contract in state-owned enterprises,whereas power allocation does not have a significant governance role in private enterprises.

关 键 词：客户关系型交易 经理人薪酬 权力配置 产权性质 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]