外部专利引进和自主研发选择的重复博弈研究  

The Research on Repeated Game between External Patent Introduction and Selection of Independent R&D

作　　者：罗恺[1] 袁晓东[2] 李相朋[1] 谢萌[1] LUO Kai;YUAN Xiao-dong;LI Xiang-peng;XIE Meng(Wuhan Textile University,Wuhan 430074,China;Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉纺织大学,武汉430074 [2]华中科技大学,武汉430074

出　　处：《科技和产业》2018年第4期66-71,共6页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71373088);武汉纺织大学科技创新计划(153062);湖北省社会科学项目(2015040);湖北省高校知识产权推进工程

摘　　要：以重复博弈理论为工具,分析了外部专利成本、贴现因子对企业外部专利引进和自主研发选择策略的影响。研究发现,企业引进的外部专利成本在一定范围内变化,企业将采取外部专利引进策略,促使了企业积极引进所需专利,替代自主研发;企业策略选择还跟贴现因子有关,贴现因子在一定范围内取值越大,企业越有耐心,越倾向于自主研发;贴现因子越小,企业将会缺乏耐心,倾向引进外部专利替代自主研发。最后,提出相应的政策建议。Based on taking repeated game theory as the means,this paper analyzed the influence of exogenous factor on enterprises’selection of introducing external patent as well as R&D independently.The research discovered that,external patent costs change within certain scope,the external patent acquisition strategy adopted by enterprises promoted them to obtain the patents they need positively,instead of independent R&D;in addition,enterprise innovation strategy is related to discount factor,which indicates that,the greater the discount factor is,the more patient the enterprise is,and the more likely it is to R&D independently,and the less likely the enterprises will be impatient and adopt external patent introduction instead.At last,the corresponding policy suggestions are proposed.

关 键 词：外部专利引进 自主研发 重复博弈 贴现因子 

分 类 号：G306[文化科学]