基层员工道德风险与非自愿失业的博弈分析  

Game Model Analysis on Moral Hazard and Involuntary Unemployment of Common Employee

作　　者：陈德超 李中斌[1] 蔡宝清 CHEN De-chao;LI Zhong-bin;CAI Bao-qing(College of Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou,Fujian 350002,China)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学管理学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《台湾农业探索》2018年第1期66-70,共5页Taiwan Agricultural Research

基　　金：福建省科技厅软科学项目(2016R0009)

摘　　要：通过构建用人单位与基层员工之间博弈分析模型,从博弈论角度说明道德风险行为和非自愿失业存在的必然性,以及两者之间的联系。根据博弈分析结果,指出用人单位必须完善当前不太健全的用人制度,并建议用人单位从提高工资水平、合理利用非自愿失业困扰、建立健全监督检查机制等角度采取措施来提高基层员工工作积极性。By constructing the analytical model of game between the employer and the employee,the necessity of moral hazard and involuntary unemployment were determined from the point of game,and the relationship between both were analyzed in this paper.Based on the results of the game analysis,it was indicated that the employer must improve the employment system which was unhealthy currently.And several suggestions were proposed for the employer to increase the work enthusiasm of staff,such as raising wages,reasonable voluntary unemployment,establishing and improving supervision and inspection mechanism,etc.

关 键 词：道德风险 非自愿失业 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]