上市企业的自主创新驱动困境:是免费补贴还是税收递延?  

The dilemma of how to encourage indigenous innovation on listed companies: By free subsidy or by tax deferral

作　　者：唐书林[1] 肖振红[1] 苑婧婷[2] TANG Shu-lin;XIAO Zhen-hong;YUAN Jing-ting(School of Economic and Management,Harbin Engineering University,Harbin 150001,China;School of Economic and Management,Northeast Agricultural University,Harbin 150001,China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]东北农业大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2018年第2期95-106,共12页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271063);黑龙江省社会科学基金资助项目(12B072);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(HEUCF140908);黑龙江省高等教育教学改革资助项目(JG2014010969);黑龙江省博士后资助经费(LBH-Z14069)

摘　　要：文章利用系统演化理论和多元线性模型相互验证的方式来诠释企业自主创新驱动机制。首先建立了基于研发投入、政府补贴和税收补贴3种不同经济行为的演化博弈模型,并将税收递延引入到该博弈模型中形成新的演化模型,对两个模型的不动点和稳定性进行比较后提出"税收递延优于免费补贴"理论猜想。随后利用1216家上市公司数据构建计量模型,通过经验证据比较政府补贴和税收递延对企业自主创新的影响程度。结果表明:(1)税收递延对自主创新的影响要优于政府补贴,这是因为企业的政治背景严重影响了免费补贴激励创新的公平性,同时企业经营绩效的不确定性增大了免费补贴的资源配置扭曲程度,进而影响免费补贴引导创新的有效性,政府应采取面向创新过程或结果的公共补贴政策。(2)政府补贴的获取出现"国进民退"不良形势,国有企业的政治背景影响了政府补贴激励创新的有效性,应以递延减税的方式解决民营企业创新的"麦克米伦缺口";(3)高管持股的"利益趋同效应"是引起国有企业创新效率低下的重要原因,形成政府扶持创新的"南橘北枳"现象,建议政府审批创新激励对象时应着重考察高管持股方面的因素。(4)值得注意的是,本文研究发现在高新技术企业中首席技术官的学术声誉会使政府产生"盲目追新"的扶持政策,而且首席技术官和企业创始人重叠的现象会在制定创新战略时形成"一言堂"现象,让高新技术企业跌落到"理想股权"陷阱。Although innovation is considered as the source of enterprise vitality,innovation investment is not the optimal investment decision.With the view for enterprises appetite for innovation diminishing by high risk and revenue externality,the government will use the public policy to stimulate enterprises to enhance investment in R&D in order to promote innovation.Public policy support for innovation can create not only a stable cash flow to reduce the innovation cost and risk,but also national atmosphere of innovation support to improve the autonomy of enterprise innovation.Due to the lack of government regulation of innovation,free subsidy has been used to be a major public policy to support innovation for a long time.The policy has received criticisms for its drawbacks,such as the phenomenon of stressing item and overlooking management,and selective funding.As such,tax credit policies which are result-oriented are considered.However,the current literature has failed to find an optimal way to formulate tax credit policies because of the diversity of tax credit.In order to compare the influence of free subsidies and tax credit on enterprise innovation,scholars and policy makers have been trying to find more accurate research framework.This paper tries to introduce the evolutionary game model to describe the innovation process of national innovation system,and find some evidence about the point of view which declares that using tax deferral to drive innovation is better than free subsidies by comparing the difference of system stability between the normal decision-making and tax deferral.An OLS model was established to verify the incentive effect between government subsidy and tax deferred by 1216 listed companies’data of Shenzhen Stock Exchange.Firstly,we construct an enterprise innovation evolutionary game model,and develop an improved evolutionary game model by adding tax deferral decision.Our findings validate that tax deferral can improve system stability through the comparison of fixed point and stability betw

关 键 词：自主创新 免费补贴 税收递延 混沌演化 

分 类 号：F272.5[经济管理—企业管理]