考虑风险偏好的生鲜农产品供应链激励契约设计  

Design of incentive contract for fresh agricultural products supply chain considering risk preference

作　　者：郑琪[1] 范体军[1] ZHENG Qi;FAN Ti-jun(School of Business,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237,China)

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2018年第2期171-178,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部新世纪人才计划资助项目(NCET-11-0637);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71431004);国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71171082;71202052)

摘　　要：针对生鲜农产品"农超对接"模式中的信息不对称,采用委托代理理论建立了生鲜农产品供应链激励契约的数学模型。结合生鲜农产品流通过程产生巨大损耗的特性,研究了生鲜农产品新鲜度和风险偏好程度对供应链利润的影响,并探讨了生鲜农产品投入质量安全科技因素前后供应链利润的变动趋势。结果表明:生鲜农产品供应链各主体的利润随着新鲜度的减小而减少,随着风险偏好程度的增大而呈现先减少后增加的趋势;考虑生鲜农产品质量安全科技投入激励契约后,超市、生鲜农产品生产商以及供应链总利润都在不同程度上有所提高。最后通过算例分析对结论进行了验证。Fresh agricultural product is an important part of modern agriculture.The operation of the supply chain is related to the improvement of people's living standard.However,due to the perishable nature of the fresh agricultural products,and its diversified and complex operation patterns,especially the issue of information asymmetry and their different risk preferences among the main supply chain members in different operation modes,the loss rate of fresh agricultural products in the supply chain operation is high.Currently,"farming-supermarket"docking has many disadvantage,such as stabilizing the price of fresh products,reducing intermediate links in circulation,protecting the supply chain benefit of each main member and promoting food safety and others.More and more fresh products supply chains are using this model.Therefore,there is an urgent need to study the supply chain coordination of asymmetric information and risk preference in"farming-supermarket"docking model,in order to improve the circulation efficiency of fresh agricultural products and reduce the loss rate.This paper considers asymmetric information of farmer and supermarket in the supply chain of fresh agricultural products,and the supply chain system consisting of one fresh product supplier and one retailer.The principal-agent theory is used to establish the problem of both participates having different target functions,and a mathematics model of incentive contract for fresh agricultural products supply chain.This paper investigates how product freshness impacts profit of fresh agricultural products supply chain after considering all the features of fresh agricultural products,such as seasonal and periodic production,a huge loss in circulation,the limited time in consumption,and safety of the product in quality.At the same time,different risk preference and the operational mode of fresh agricultural products supply chain make great differences.Therefore,the effect of risk preference on fresh product supply chain’s profit is studied.However,fresh ag

关 键 词：生鲜农产品 新鲜度 供应链 风险偏好程度 激励契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]