铁路工程项目业主与承包商合作行为研究  

Research on Cooperative Behavior between Owner and Contractor of Railway Engineering Projects

作　　者：赵李萍 王岳森 曹光美 孙东冶 杨洋[3] ZHAO Liping;WANG Yuesen;CAO Guangmei;SUN Dongye;YANG Yang(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;School of Economics and Management,Shijiazhuang Tiedao University,Shijiazhuang 050043,China;School of Traffic and Transportation,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]石家庄铁道大学经济管理学院,河北石家庄050043 [3]北京交通大学交通运输学院,北京100044

出　　处：《铁道学报》2018年第4期143-150,共8页Journal of the China Railway Society

基　　金：河北省科技项目(12457206D-14)

摘　　要：在对近10年中国铁路工程项目招投标情况初步分析的基础上,重点探讨铁路工程项目承发包过程中业主与承包商之间多重、反复的博弈行为。构建有限理性下铁路工程项目业主和承包商关系的演化博弈模型,分析博弈双方行为的演化路径和稳定均衡策略,探究业主和承包商合作行为的产生条件,以解释招投标方式、竞争性谈判和协议模式的形成、演进规律。结果表明:业主与承包商之间的合作行为具有路径依赖性,二者之间合作的概率与二者的初始成本投入和合作收益因子正相关,与外部激励因子即一方违约时对其所处罚金负相关;存在最优的合作收益与成本分配比例使得二者合作概率最大;同时合理的违约成本与强有力的管控有利于减少机会主义行为的产生。Based on the analysis of engineering project tendering practice in the railway sector in China over the past 10 years,mainly discussed multiple and repetitive game behaviors between the owner and contractor during railway construction project contracting.By building the evolutionary game model of the relationship between the owner and contractor in railway engineering projects under bounded rationality,the paper analyzed the evolution process and the evolutionary equilibrium strategies of both sides of the game to explore the condition of cooperative behavior between the owner and the contractor,in order to explain the formation and evolution of the bidding mode,competitive negotiation and protocol mode.The results show that the cooperation behaviors between the owner and contractor are path dependent.The cooperation probability between them is positively related to initial cost input and cooperative income factor of the two parties,and is negatively related to the external incentive factor.Optimal allocation ratio of cooperation benefits and costs results in greatest cooperation probability between the two parties.The rational default cost and strong control may help to reduce opportunistic behaviors.

关 键 词：铁路工程项目 合作行为 演化博弈论 协议模式 稳定均衡策略 

分 类 号：U29-3[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]