考虑产品替代的低碳供应链定价和政府财税  

Low-carbon supply chain enterprises price decision and government policy considering product substitution

作　　者：许长延[1] 汪传旭[1] XU Changyan;WANG Chuanxu(School of Economy and Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《计算机工程与应用》2018年第9期231-236,共6页Computer Engineering and Applications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.71373157)

摘　　要：基于低碳经济背景,考虑由政府、制造商和零售商三方博弈构成的供应链,使用Stackelberg博弈和纳什均衡的分析方法求出模型的均衡解,并对比了零售商是否联合两种模式下的社会福利、制造商和零售商利润。结果表明:零售商联合情况下的零售商和制造商利润大于零售商非联合情形,同时产品需求量和社会福利与零售商非联合情形相同。高碳产品市场规模越大,社会福利、零售商和制造商利润会先下降后上升,低碳产品的生产成本增加,社会福利、制造商利润会下降,若零售商不联合,销售高碳产品零售商利润上升,销售低碳产品零售商利润下降,若零售商联合则零售商利润下降。Based on the background of low-carbon economy,a supply chain composed of government,manufacturer and retailer is considered,and the equilibrium solution of the model is obtained with Stackelberg game and Nash equilibrium analysis method.Social welfare,profits of manufacturers and retailers are compared with retailers cooperation and without retailers cooperation.The results show that if retailer are cooperated,the profits of retailer and manufacturer are higher,and product demand and social welfare are the same with that when retailers are not cooperated.The social welfare,profits of retailers and manufacturers will decrease and then increase if the market size of high-carbon products increases.If the production cost of low-carbon products increases,the social welfare and the profits of manufacturers decrease,the profit of retailer which sales high-carbon products increases and the profit of retailer which sales low-carbon products decrease if retailers are not cooperated,and the profit of retailer decrease if retailers are cooperated.

关 键 词：补贴 碳税 产品替代 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]