控股股东股权质押影响高管薪酬——业绩敏感性吗?  被引量:62

Does the Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge Affect-Executive Pay-For-Performance Sensitivity?

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作  者:李常青[1] 幸伟 LI Chang-Qing;XING Wei(School of Management,XiamenUniversity,Xiamen,Fujian,361005,China)

机构地区:[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出  处:《经济管理》2018年第5期157-174,共18页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基  金:国家自然科学基金项目"控股股东股权质押动机;经济后果与治理机制研究"(71672157);国家自然科学基金重大项目"中国制度和文化背景下公司财务政策的理论与实践研究"(71790601);国家自然科学基金项目"中国上市公司关联交易研究:动机;经济后果与治理机制"(71572165)

摘  要:以高管薪酬—业绩敏感性为切入点,本文深入分析控股股东股权质押对公司治理水平的影响及其路径。本文以2003-2016年沪深两市上市公司年度数据为研究样本,研究发现,与不存在控股股东股权质押的公司相比,存在控股股东股权质押的上市公司高管薪酬—业绩敏感性更弱,但这种现象只在非国有上市公司中存在,上述结论在尽可能控制内生性问题后依然成立。在进一步的分析中,本文还发现,在控股股东股权质押的上市公司高管薪酬的增幅更大,且薪酬增幅高的公司掏空程度和盈余管理水平也更严重。本文的研究结论表明,控股股东股权质押后出于掏空或者规避控制权转移风险的考虑,会干预上市公司的财务决策,从而降低薪酬激励的有效性,弱化公司治理。In order to broadenfinancing channels ofthe shareholders and relieve its financing constraints,China s“Guarantee Law”and“Property Law”provisions that“legally transferable shares”can be pledged.Because of the equity pledge does not need other shareholder agree and without need the regulatory approval,the control rights and voting rights of shareholders pledge after shareholder equity is not affected by the shareholder equity pledge,the equity pledge is very popular by the shareholderin recent years,and developing rapidlyin the A stock market.The key element of the equity pledge business is the stock price.And the stock price is always fluctuation.When the stock price falls,the pledged shareholder has to repurchase the equity pledges or additional guarantee tokeep control ofprivate-interest Therefore,when the stock price decline,the equity pledge of controlling shareholders in order to avoid the transfer of control,is likely to use their control power to intervene in the financial decisions of listed companies(such as:informationdisclosure,earningsmanagement,cash holdings level,tax avoidance strategy,or suspension etc.)to maintain or raise the stock price;secondly,the equity pledge by the controlling shareholder maybe face financial distress,financial distress of the controlling shareholders of listed companies are more likely to be tunneling the listed companies;thirdly,the equity pledged would result the separation of cash flow rights and control rights,separation of the rights increase also will result the pledge controlling shareholders of listed companies increased tunneling the company.Infact,although the controlling shareholders hold the right of appointing executives,they usually do not directly participate in the daily operation and management of companies.Executives as a company insider,not only responsible for the company s daily operation and management activities,but also holds a large number of firm s private information.The controlling shareholder of equity pledge is required to cooperate

关 键 词:股权质押 产权性质 薪酬-业绩敏感性 

分 类 号:F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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