央地财政分权的“选择构筑”视角兼论中央财政权力的宪法约束  

A Choice Architecture Perspective on China's Central-Local Fiscal Arrangement Setting Reasonable Restraints overthe Fiscal Powers of China's Central Government

作　　者：郭锐[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学法学院

出　　处：《中外法学》2018年第2期364-378,共15页Peking University Law Journal

基　　金：中国人民大学法学院宪法和部门法关系青年教师学术创新团队的支持

摘　　要：对央地财政分权中的权力配置及其限度,特别是中央财政权力合理限制,应作宪法考察。通过"选择构筑"视角,可以更好地展示中国当前财政分权体制的特征,即中央财政权力的过分强大和地方自主性的缺失。中央政府通过项目制为基础的专项转移支付,对地方财政支出目的、力度和方式等产生实质性影响,造成地方政府的政策选择的扭曲,也间接导致中央政府政策目标难以实现、地方政府难以设定本地财政政策目标和公共服务面临质量压力。"选择构筑"视角帮助我们看到中央政府的财政权力应根据宪法平衡央地关系的基本原则进行限制和约束,这对央地财政分权的进一步改革也有指导意义。当下的央地财政分权改革,应明确全国人大、地方人大在专项转移支付项目的申请、实施和验收阶段的参与和监督,同时也应由司法机关来介入和解决中央和地方财权的相关冲突。This paper sets forth a constitutional analysis on the allocation of fiscal powers between the central and local governments,and advocates for reasonable restraints of the central government's fiscal power.Adopting a’choice architecture”perspective,I argue that the fundamental feature of China’s al-location of fiscal powers is the central government's dominant influence on the area,amount and means of the local government's fiscal spending,leading to the difficulty in realizing the central government's policy goals,in local governments’deciding their own policy goals,and in maintaining the quality of pub-lic service.The“choice architecture”perspective highlights the necessity to subject the central govern-ment's fiscal powers to the constitutional principles on balancing the central-local relationship,which is provided in Article 3 of the Chinese Constitution and Article 89,99 and 107 that define the powers and obligations of the National People’s Congress,the People’s Congresses at the local levels,the national government,and the governments at the local level.Based on the constitutional analysis,the reform of the allocation of fiscal powers between the central and local governments should(1)include the National People'Congress as well as the People'Congresses of the local levels,and(2)clarify that the judiciary should be in charge of solving potential conflicts related to the the fiscal power allocation.

关 键 词：财政分权 中央地方关系 项目制 “控制权”理论视角 选择构筑 

分 类 号：D921[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]