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作 者:李盈盈[1] 张雪梅[1,2] 陈媛媛[1] 李晓梅 LI Yingying;ZHANG Xuemei;CHEN Yuanyuan;LI Xiaomei(School of Business,Fuyang Normal University,Fuyang Anhui 236037,China;Anhui Provincial Key Laboratory of Regional Logistics Planning and Modern Logistics Engineering,Fuyang Normal University,Fuyang Anhui 236037,China)
机构地区:[1]阜阳师范学院商学院,安徽阜阳236037 [2]阜阳师范学院区域物流规划与现代物流工程安徽省重点实验室,安徽阜阳236037
出 处:《阜阳师范学院学报(自然科学版)》2018年第3期21-27,共7页Journal of Fuyang Normal University(Natural Science)
基 金:国家自然科学基金(71771055);高校优秀青年人才支持计划重点项目(gxyq ZD2018063)资助
摘 要:在双渠道供应链中,根据Stackelberg博弈分析,分别讨论集中决策与分散决策中价格一致与非一致时制造商和零售商的最优定价决策。结果表明,集中决策下,当网络渠道规模系数较大时,网络渠道的直销价格大于传统零售渠道的零售价格。价格非一致模式下,分散决策的网络渠道直销价格要高于集中决策的网络渠道直销价格。价格非一致下的批发价格要高于价格一致下的批发价格。零售商会选择价格非一致模式;而只有当网络渠道规模系数较大时,制造商也选择价格非一致模式。无论集中决策还是分散决策,价格非一致模式下供应链利润较大。最后通过数值分析了集中决策和分散决策不同价格模式下制造商和零售商的销售价格、批发价格和利润的大小变化情况。In the dual channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,according to the Stackelberg game analysis,the optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer in centralized and decentralized decision-making are discussed respectively.The results show that when the scale coefficient of the network channel is large,the direct selling price of the network channel is larger than that of the traditional retail channel.In the case of price inconsistency,the direct selling price of decentralized decision channel is higher than that of centralized decision channel.The wholesale price under the price inconsistency model is higher than that under the price consistency model.The retailer will choose the price inconsistency model,and the manufacturer will choose the price inconsistency model when the network channel size coefficient is larger.Whether centralized decision or decentralized decision,supply chain profit is larger under the price inconsistency model.Finally,the change of the sales price,the wholesale price and the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer under the different pricing models of centralized and decentralized decision-making are numerically analyzed.
关 键 词:双渠道供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 价格模式
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