论何物存在（英文）  

On What There Is

作　　者：许涤非[1] Difei Xu(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2018年第3期18-33,共16页Studies in Logic

基　　金：supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(Grant No.17BZX089)

摘　　要：本文首先澄清了蒯因的本体论承诺不能回答逻辑理论的本体论承诺的问题。然后分析了Kit Fine(2009)对量化理论的批评。尽管本文同意"本体论承诺"本身并没有解释日常承诺与理论承诺的距离,但是不同意本体论承诺的哲学分析是平常的或者是非哲学的。本文还讨论了Fine(2009)与叶峰(2010)所阐述的两种实在论,并且认为他们的结论下得草率。通过比较弗雷格和蒯因的本体论理论,本文分析了蒯因的本体论承诺的起源以及弗雷格对本体论的量化解释的评论。In this paper,I first clarify that Quine’s ontological commitments thesis cannot provide answers to logical theories.Then I explore Kit Fine’s criticism(2009)on the quantificational account of ontology.Although I agree that“ontological commitments”does not itself provide an explanation for distancing ordinary commitments from theoretical commitments,I disagree that the philosophical analysis underlying ontological commitments thesis is trivial or non-philosophical.I also discuss two kinds of realism formulated by Fine(2009)and Ye(2010),and argue that their conclusions are swiftly drawn.In comparison with Frege and Quine,I analyze the origin of Quine’s ontological commitments and Frege’s comments on the quantificational account of ontology.

关 键 词：本体论承诺 哲学分析 逻辑理论 弗雷格 蒯因 实在论 量化 是非 

分 类 号：B81-0[哲学宗教—逻辑学]