预期的力量:晋升会引致环境污染吗?——基于工具变量法的实证研究  

The power of expectation: Does promotion cause pollution?——The empirical research based on Instrumental-Variable method

作　　者：谭志雄[1,2] 张阳阳[3] 付佳[4] TAN Zhi-xiong;ZHANG Yang-yang;FU Jia(School of Public Affairs,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;Public Economy and Public Policy Research Center,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;School of Economics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100876,China;Economics and Business Administration College of Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学公共管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学公共经济与公共政策研究中心,重庆400044 [3]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100876 [4]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2018年第4期37-45,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社科基金资助重大招标项目(12&ZD209);中央高校基本科研业务费(106112016CDJXY010011);重庆市研究生科研创新项目(CYB16005);中国博士后科学基金资助面上项目(2012M511898);重庆市博士后研究人员科研项目特别资助项目(XM20120024)

摘　　要：本文运用1994~2012年中国31个省份省长省委书记的数据与环境污染排放综合指数,尝试分阶段考察中国官员政治晋升与环境污染的关系。为剥离出环境污染对官员晋升的反向因果影响,本文通过筛选,将环境污染和工业增加值的滞后变量、官员年龄作为模型的工具变量,采用GMM估计官员政治晋升对环境污染的影响。研究显示,官员晋升对环境污染的影响存在职位差异和地区差异。就省长而言,在任职前期的污染投资行为会增加其获得晋升的预期,从而使其任职后期的污染排放随晋升可能性的增大而减少;而省委书记则由于年龄和职位的约束缺乏获得晋升的预期,晋升预期对其任职后期的污染排放影响不显著。从地区层面来看,官员任职后期,东部地区省长、省委书记晋升对污染排放的减少量和增加量基本相互抵消,中部地区省长晋升对污染排放的减少量大于省委书记的增加量,使得环境污染排放减少;西部地区则由于经济基础较差,官员晋升预期欲望相对不强烈,使得省长省委书记晋升对环境污染排放影响不显著。After nearly 40 years of reforming and opening the market,China is facing the persistent contamination and deterioration of natural environment,which has attracted the attention of scholars around the world.However,there are a few scholars analyzing the environmental pollution problem from the viewpoint of Chinese special political institution.In China,the central government is in charge of the appointment of officials and the initiation of major reform policies,but the local government is responsible for the execution of policies.However,due to the inconsistence of the target functions of the central and local governments,the local officials have motivations to execute distortedly or even reject the policies initiated by the central government which go against their promotion.Consequently,the local officials concerning the issue of environmental pollution may deregulate pollution emissions in exchange for more investment,and more likely to get promoted.Based on the principles mentioned above,this paper collects the data of 31 provinces from 1994 to 2012,from their local governors and secretaries of Provincial Party Committee as well as integrated index of environmental pollution emissions.This paper attempts to examine the relationship between political promotion of Chinese officials and environmental pollution in different career stages.Due to the endogenous problem induced by the reverse causation between environmental pollution and official’s promotion,the paper firstly selects the lagged variable of environmental pollution and industry added value,the official’s age and other factors as instrumental variables by theoretical analysis and Probit regression model.Additionally,the results of Probit model indicates that the championship promotion hypothesis meets limitations when explaining the promotion of Chinese officials.We further estimate the influence of official’s promotion on environmental pollution by GMM method.The result shows that the influence of official promotion on environmental pollution e

关 键 词：政治晋升 环境污染 晋升预期 工具变量法 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] X50[环境科学与工程—环境工程]