国有企业治理结构多群体行为演化研究  

Research on Multi-group Behavior Evolution of Governance Structure of State-owned Enterprise

作　　者：段永传 李雪梅[1] 李学伟[1] DUAN Yong-chuan;LI Xue-mei;LI Xue-wei(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044

出　　处：《北京交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第4期54-66,共13页Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"基于旅客出行偏好的客运通道内不同客运方式分担率研究"(51778047)

摘　　要：从董事会、经理层、监事会的风险认知、行为选择入手,基于演化博弈论建立国有企业治理结构多群体行为演化模型,探讨多群体行为的演化稳定策略、演化趋势和演化路径影响因素。通过分析演化稳定策略,仿真行为演化规律发现:(1)系统状态收敛为国有企业董事会成员、经理人采取违规策略,监事会成员认真监管;(2)国有企业董事会成员、经理人和监事会成员行为演化具有明显的路径依赖特征;(3)国有企业董事会成员、经理人和监事会成员行为演化策略的均衡不仅仅取决于自身收益,还受到其他两群体收益的影响;其行为影响因子包括利导因子和限制因子,其行为演化过程是在两种因子的双重作用下完成。因此,应激活国有企业治理的力量和活性,加大对国有企业董事会和经理层舞弊的惩罚力度和信息披露力度,优化国有企业董事会、经理层和监事会的薪酬结构,推动国有企业制度改革,全面提升国有企业治理水平。This paper,by establishing a multi-group behavior evolution model based on risk cognition and behavior choice of board of directors,managers and board of supervisors,explores the evolution law of multi-group behavior,evolution trend and factors affecting evolution route of multi-group of governance structure of state-owned enterprise.Based on the analysis of evolution stable strategy,mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and simulating behavior evolution rules,some results are revealed as follows.Firstly,current system converges to a state where board of directors and managers adopt illegal behavior and members of the board of supervisors conduct strict supervision.Secondly,the behavior evolution of board of directors,managers and board of supervisors shows obvious path dependence.Thirdly,evolutionary strategy equilibrium of board of directors,managers and board of supervisors is not only subject to their own revenue but is affected by the revenue of the other two groups.Meanwhile,influencing factors of interest group behavior include simulative factor and limiting factors.The behavior evolution process is accomplished under the influence of both simulative factor and limiting factor.The paper proposes a vigorous controlling behavior strategy,while activating the power and activity of governance of state-owned enterprise,increasing the penalties and disclosure of corruption information on the board of directors and managers,optimizing the pay structure of the board of directors,managers and supervisors,and promoting the system reform of state-owned enterprises to enhance the overall governance level of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：系统工程 行为演化 演化博弈论 利益群体 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]