非对称信息下电子产品逆向供应链激励机制研究  

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Reverse Supply Chain of Electronic Products Under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：姬晓辉[1] 张蒙[1] 李玉龙[1] Ji Xiaohui;Zhang Meng;Li Yulong(Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2018年第11期75-83,共9页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于异质性主体行为的产业集群低碳演化模型及其仿真研究"(项目编号:71271159);国家社会科学基金重大项目"全面深化改革视阈下社会治理体制与机制创新研究"(项目编号:14ZDA062)

摘　　要：本文针对废旧电子产品市场中由再制造商和回收商组成的逆向供应链,研究了在回收商的回收能力和回收努力程度均为私有信息时,再制造商如何甄别回收商的真实能力并实施有效激励的激励机制设计问题。运用博弈论和激励理论,构建了双重信息不对称情况下且回收商的回收能力为连续类型时的激励模型,并与单一信息不对称的情况进行对比,最后通过数值仿真验证。结果表明:考虑双重信息不对称时,再制造商期望收益减少,回收商的回收努力程度降低而期望收益减少,系统绩效降低;针对不同类型的回收商设计差异化的激励机制,不仅能够实现信息甄别,而且可以诱导回收商提高回收努力程度。Aimed at the reverse supply chain constituted by the remanufacture and recycler in the market of waste electronic products,the problem of how to distinguish the real ability of recyclers and how to implement effective incentive mechanism is stu-died when recyclers recycling ability and recycling efforts are all private information.Incorporating game theory and incentive theory,an incentive model with the dual information asymmetry of moral hazard and adverse selection is constructed under the condition that recyclers recycling ability type is continuous,and then the model is compared with the single information asymmetry considering only moral hazard,which is verified by numerical simulation.The results show that:under dual situation system performance will reduce,the expected revenue of remanufacture decreases and recycler s effort level reduces but revenue increases;designing different incentive mechanism for different types of recyclers can not only realize information screening,but also induce recyclers to improve their recovery efforts.

关 键 词：单一信息不对称 双重信息不对称 激励机制 电子产品回收 回收能力 道德风险 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济] F416.63