其他综合收益、管理防御与高管薪酬  

Other Comprehensive Income,Management Entrenchment and Executive Compensation

作　　者：赵艳 张云[2] ZHAO Yan;ZHANG Yun

机构地区：[1]山东理工大学管理学院 [2]天津财经大学商学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2018年第11期58-70,共13页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：山东省社会科学规划项目"异质性企业高管变更影响经营绩效的财务机理与对策研究"(项目编号:17CGLJ28)

摘　　要：笔者以2009—2014年存在其他综合收益的A股上市公司为样本,将管理防御理论纳入分析框架,研究其他综合收益对高管薪酬的影响。研究发现:其他综合收益与高管薪酬显著正相关,正值其他综合收益对高管薪酬的影响显著大于负值的其他综合收益,存在"重奖轻罚"现象;进一步研究发现防御程度高的管理者会选择"风险规避"的防御路径,即较高的管理防御程度弱化了其他综合收益与高管薪酬之间的相关关系。研究表明其他综合收益在净利润基础上为考核管理者业绩提供了增量信息,但也为管理防御提供了操作空间,导致高管薪酬未能恰当利用其他综合收益信息。本研究拓展了高管薪酬与公司业绩的关系研究,对业绩报告改革背景下高管薪酬机制的设计具有借鉴意义,同时也为我国综合收益报告的发展提供了经验证据。This paper selects 2009 to 2014,a total of 6 years of the listed companies as the research sample.We putting management entrenchment theory into research framework of relationship between other comprehensive income and the executive compensation.Empirical results show that other comprehensive income have a positive impact on the executive compensation,while the unrealized gains recognized as other comprehensive income has a more significant effects on executive pay compared to the unrealized losses;Further testing finds that entrenchment managers will choose“risk aversion”path,namely the increase in the intensity of executive s management entrenchment will weaken the relevant relationship between executive compensation and other comprehensive income.This paper shows that other comprehensive income provides incremental information for manager performance measures system on the basis of net profit,however,top manager has incentives to take management entrenchment behaviors in the process of using this information.This paper enriches the literatures on executive compensation-performance and also provides the experiential evidence for the effectiveness on the reform of performance report.

关 键 词：其他综合收益 高管薪酬 管理防御 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]