市场规模、产品差异与管理授权  

Market Size, Product Differentiation and Managerial Delegation: Based on Vertical Relations

作　　者：石俊国 朱程鹏 王海婧[1] SHI Jun-guo;ZHU Cheng-peng;WANG Hai-jing

机构地区：[1]江苏大学财经学院

出　　处：《产业经济评论》2018年第6期44-50,共7页Review of Industrial Economics

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2018SJA1060);江苏大学高级专业人才科研启动基金(17JDG005;18JDG005)

摘　　要：本文基于纵向关系视角,考察不同价格合同下市场规模与产品差异对下游企业管理授权方式的影响。研究发现,产品差异性越大,企业所有者越倾向选择更激进的管理授权方式;在浮动价格合同下市场规模越大,企业所有者越倾向选择不激进管理授权方式,而在固定价格下,则会选择激进的授权方式。另外,下游产品销量、下游企业利润、消费者剩余、社会福利与市场规模正相关,与产品差异性负相关。本文将管理授权问题扩展到纵向关系视角,为企业在不同市场结构下确定管理授权方式提供理论参考。Based on vertical relationship,we examine the impact of market size and product differentiation on managerial delegation of downstream firms within different price contracts.The study finds,owner will choose more aggressive manager with larger product differentiation.In floating price contract,owner will choose less aggressive manager with differentiation,but more aggressive one in fixed price contact.In addition,sales and profits of downstream firms,consumer surplus and social welfare are positive with market size and negative with product differentiation.This paper extends the study by vertical relation perspective,and provides reference for firms to make managerial delegation.

关 键 词：管理授权 纵向关系 市场规模 产品差异 浮动价格合同 固定价格合同 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理]