内部交易者会进行信息共享吗?（英文）  

Will Informed Traders Share*Information with Each Other?

作　　者：凌碰 LING Peng(China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院,北京100081

出　　处：《经济数学》2018年第4期31-38,共8页Journal of Quantitative Economics

摘　　要：在Kyle模型中引入两个异质的内部交易者,利用理论模型推导的方式探讨他们是否会进行信息共享.研究发现在均衡状态下,内部交易者的期望利润是关于信息共享数量的减函数.当两个内部交易者不分享任何信息时,他们的期望利润能达到最大值;内部交易者没有动机进行信息共享.This paper introduced two heterogeneous insiders into Kyle model,and based on theoretical deduction,ex-plored the possibility that they shared information with each other.The paper finds that in equilibrium,the expected profit of the insider is a decreasing function with respect to the number of information to share.When the two insiders do not share any information,their expected profits can reach the maximum.The conclusion is that insiders have no incentive to share any infor-mation.

关 键 词：Kyle模型 内部交易者 信息共享 期望利润 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]