市政邻避设施规划风险沟通演化博弈分析  

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Risk Communication in Planning Municipal NIMBY Facilities

作　　者：俞武扬[1] 邹晓梅 YU Wu-yang;ZOU Xiao-mei(School of Management, Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《杭州电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第6期37-44,共8页Journal of Hangzhou Dianzi University：Social Sciences

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目(17NDJC053YB)

摘　　要：近年来,我国许多城市原有的市政设施已经难以跟上城市化进程的步伐,诸如垃圾焚烧厂、污水处理站等市政邻避设施急需规划建设,但频繁发生的邻避冲突却又使得这些设施的建设举步维艰。地方政府与社区居民关于邻避设施的风险认知差异是邻避冲突发生的重要原因。文章基于风险沟通对风险认知的作用构建了两者间的演化博弈模型,根据博弈模型的演化稳定性分析了九种情形下博弈双方的策略演化形态,并通过数值例子展示了四种演化稳定策略的仿真结果。最后,根据博弈结果和杭州余杭九峰"中泰群体性事件"从促进地方政府进行风险沟通以及引导社区居民认同市政邻避设施建设两方面提出了相关政策建议。In recent years,it is hard for most original municipal facilities to keep up with the rapid urbanization process in many cities,such as the waste incineration,the sewage treatment station and the other municipal NIMBY facilities,which are badly in need of planning and construction,on the other hand,the frequent occurrence of NIMBY conflicts make them most difficult to be constructed.The difference between the local government and the community residents in the cognition of risk is an important reason for the emergence of the NIMBY conflict.Based on the effect of risk communication in the risk cognition,the evolutionary game model of both sides is constructed.According to the evolutionary stability of game models,the evolution of the game strategies in nine situations is analyzed,and the simulation results of the four evolutionary stable strategies by numerical examples are demonstrated.Finally,on the basis of the game results and the“Zhongtai mass disturbance”at Jiufeng Yuhang in Hangzhou,some relevant policy suggestions are put forward from the following two aspects:promoting the local government risk communication and guiding the community residents to acknowledge the construction of the municipal NIMBY facilities.

关 键 词：市政邻避设施 风险沟通 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] X24[环境科学与工程—环境科学]