基于声誉信任的买方电子订单融资契约协调模型  

Contract Coordination Model of Buyer's Electronic Order Financing Based on Reputation Trust 1

作　　者：宋平[1] 王硕鑫 杨琦峰[1] SONG Ping;WANG Shuo-xin;YANG Qi-feng(School of Economics,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学经济学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第6期9-17,51,共10页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71233006);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473186)

摘　　要：金融供应链协调在解决中小企业融资问题、增强供应链竞争优势等方面发挥了重要作用,而银行参与融资时从供应链声誉感知到的信任也是值得研究的问题。本文应用报童模型和Stackelberg博弈构建融资参与者的期望利润模型,采用逆向归纳法得到参与者的交易决策并进行协调性分析。研究结果表明,供应商决定的声誉水平越高,零售商的订货量越高,银行的信任程度越高、利率越低;无成本分担契约下的分散决策无法实现协调;引入零售商成本分担契约后,当分担比例达到一定值时可以实现金融供应链的协调。最后,用MATLAB对上述结论进行了数值验证。Coordination of financial supply chain plays an important role in solving the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and enhancing the competitive advantage of supply chain.The trust perceived by banks from the reputation of supply chain is also worth studying when they participate in financing.Newsboy model and Stackelberg game are used to construct the expected profit model of financing participants,and the transaction decision of participants is obtained by inverse induction method and the coordination analysis is carried out.The main results show that the higher the reputation level of supplier decision,the higher the order quantity of retailer will be,and the higher the trust degree of bank,the lower the interest rate will be;decentralized decision-making under cost-free sharing contract cannot be coordinated;the coordination of financial supply chain can be realized when the share ratio reaches a certain value after introducing the cost-sharing contract of retailer.Finally,the above conclusions are verified by MATLAB.

关 键 词：买方电子订单融资 声誉信任 交易决策 契约协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]