有限理性企业创新行为的竞争博弈分析  

Competition Game Analysis of Innovative Behaviors of Boundedly Rational Firms

作　　者：赵令锐 陈锐[1] Zhao Lingrui;Chen Rui(National Academy of Innovation Strategy,China Association for Science and Technology,Beijing 100038,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科协创新战略研究院,北京100038

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2019年第2期21-28,共8页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

摘　　要：本文基于有限理性,构建创新型企业与模仿型企业的产量竞争博弈模型,分析博弈模型均衡点的稳定性以及创新行为在博弈模型中的作用,并对理论分析结果进行数值模拟。分析发现,Nash均衡点的稳定性与所有参数都紧密相关,创新行为的相关参数对均衡点的存在性、值与稳定性都产生重要影响。模拟表明,两类企业的产量调整速度对Nash均衡点的稳定性至关重要,创新行为的相关参数确实对两类企业的均衡产量产生不同的影响效应,其中知识产权保护水平有利于创新型企业的均衡产量增加,造成模仿型企业的均衡产量下降。Based on bounded rationality,a quantity game model with innovative behaviors of boundedly rational firms was formulated in this paper.Through stability analysis and numerical simulation,the model as well as the effect of innovative behaviors were discussed.The analysis found that the stability of Nash equilibrium point was concerned with all parameters,and parameters that were related to innovative behaviors played an important role in the existence and stability of equilibrium points.The simulations showed that the speed of quantity adjustment of boundedly rational players was crucial to the stability of Nash equilibrium point,and related parameters did have a different effect on equilibrium quantities of two firms.In addition,the level of intellectual property rights(IPR)protection would make equilibrium quantity of innovative firm to increase and equilibrium quantity of imitational firm to decrease.

关 键 词：创新行为 有限理性 均衡产量 知识产权保护 动态博弈 NASH均衡点 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]