高管权力、媒体关注与高管私有收益——基于我国A股上市公司的经验证据  

Executive Power,Media Attention and Executive Private Benefits——Empirical Evidence Based on A-Share Listed Companies in China

作　　者：黄娟[1] 张达龙 HUANG Juan;ZHANG Da-long(School of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《财经理论研究》2019年第1期96-112,共17页Journal of Finance and Economics Theory

摘　　要：本文以2012-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,检验高管权力、媒体关注与高管私有收益之间的关系。研究发现,高管权力与高管私有收益显著正相关,媒体关注能够显著抑制高管权力对高管私有收益的正向作用。进一步研究发现,国企高管更偏好非货币性私有收益,非国企高管更偏好货币性私有收益;央企高管更偏好非货币性私有收益,地方国企高管更偏好货币性私有收益。此外,媒体关注能够显著抑制央企高管权力对高管私有收益的正向作用,但不能显著抑制地方国企高管权力对高管私有收益的正向作用。Based on China′s A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016,this paper investigates the relationship between executive power,media attention,and executive private benefits.The study finds that executive power is significantly positively related to executive private benefits.Media attention can significantly curb the positive effect of executive power on executive private benefits.Further research found that SOE executives prefer non-monetary private benefits,non-SOE executives prefer monetary private benefits,central SOE executives prefer non-monetary private benefits,and local SOE executives prefer monetary private benefits.In addition,media attention can significantly inhibit the positive effects of executive power of central SOEs on executive private benefits,but it can not significantly curb the positive effect of local SOE executives′power on executive private benefits.

关 键 词：高管权力 媒体关注 高管私有收益 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]