政府规制下电器电子产品闭环供应链回收模式决策研究  

Research on the Decisions of the Recycling Models of Closed-Loop Supply Chain for Electrical and Electronic Equipment under the Government Regulations

作　　者：侯玉梅[1] 孙金香 任静 HOU Yumei;SUN Jinxiang;REN Jing(School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao Hebei 066004,China)

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《生态经济》2019年第2期86-94,共9页Ecological Economy

基　　金：河北省人社厅留学人员科技活动项目"低碳环境下的可持续协调供应链构建的理论与方法研究"(C201400157);国家自然科学基金面上项目"供应不确定环境下零售供应链的最优合同模式与风险控制研究"(71071134);河北省人力资源和社会保障课题"基于物联网的医养结合智慧居家养老服务系统研究"(JRSHZ-2018-02009);河北省人力资源和社会保障课题"‘互联网+’居家养老平台服务定价研究"(JRS-2018-7024);河北省社会科学发展研究课题"河北城市居家与社区集合发展的养老研究"(201802120101)

摘　　要：为研究电器电子产品闭环供应链的最优回收模式,在政府规制的前提下,利用博弈论构建了制造商和零售商混合回收(M-R模式)、制造商和第三方混合回收(M-T模式)以及零售商和第三方混合回收(R-T模式)三种完全信息动态博弈模型,最后求解并对三种模式的最优决策对比分析。研究结果表明:(1)M-R模式和M-T模式对制造商最有益,即制造商参与回收对其自身效果最佳;M-T模式对第三方最有利;R-T模式则可以使零售商利润和系统利润同时最大化。(2)敏感性分析表明:各成员利润随政府补贴的增加而增长,随处理基金的增加而减小,其中处理基金的负作用非常明显。In order to study the optimal recycling model of the closed-loop supply chain for electrical and electronic products,three complete information dynamic game models are constructed based on game theory under the government regulations:the mixed recycling model of manufacturer and retailer(M-R),the mixed recycling model of manufacturer and third party(M-T),and the mixed recycling model of retailer and third party(R-T).Finally,the optimal decision of the three models is compared and analyzed.The result shows that:(1)The M-R model and the M-T model are the most beneficial to the manufacturers,that is,the recycling models with the manufacturer’s participation are the best to himself;the M-T model is the best for the third party recyclers;and the R-T model can maximize the profits of retailer and the system.(2)The sensitivity analyses show that the profits of all members increase with the increase of government subsidies,and decrease with the increase of recycling fund,and the negative effect of recycling fund is very obvious.

关 键 词：政府规制 电器电子产品回收 闭环供应链:动态博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]