布伦塔诺的亚里士多德与中世纪的对象概念  

The Medieval Cocncept of “Objective Being” and Brentano's Aristotle

作　　者：梁家荣[1] Liang Jiarong

机构地区：[1]同济大学人文学院

出　　处：《哲学研究》2019年第2期90-98,127,共10页Philosophical Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"现象学视域下的意识内容研究"(编号16BZX077)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：布伦塔诺的亚里士多德感知观被归为关于亚里士多德研究的"精神主义"的进路。作为解读亚里士多德的现代先驱,布伦塔诺主要以"意向性"概念而闻名。但是在其早年诠释亚里士多德的著作中,布伦塔诺却还没有使用"意向性"这样一个概念,而是借用了另一源自中世纪学院派的概念"以对象地"。本文集中探讨"以对象地"这一概念在中世纪哲学中有别于今日之意义,以及布伦塔诺如何以该概念来解释亚里士多德的感知观。本文最后将提出:"以对象地实存"是"意向的内实存"概念之前身。Recently,there has arisen a debate amongst scholars of classical philosophy about Aristotle's account of perception.Franz Brentano is widely held as a precursor of the so called‘spiritualist’interpretation.Nowadays,Brentano is mainly known for reviving the concept of intentionality,but it had not yet appeared in his early work on Aristotle.Instead,he made use of the concept of‘objective being’(esse obiectivum),which also has its origin in medieval scholasticism.This paper aims to put Brentano's reading of Aristotle into relief by emphasizing its connection to that medieval concept,which,as will be indicated,is precisely the precedent of the concept of intentional inexistence.

关 键 词：布伦塔诺 亚里士多德 感知 对象 内实存 

分 类 号：B503[哲学宗教—外国哲学]