电商个性化背景下企业间隐私保护的主从博弈分析  

The Leader-follow Game Analysis of Privacy Protection Between Enterprises Under the Background of E-commerce Personalization

作　　者：邓帅[1] 徐璐 Deng Shuai;Xu Lu(School of Economics and Management,Hunan Institute of Technology,Hengyang 421002,China;School of Information Management,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南工学院经济与管理学院,湖南衡阳421002 [2]华中师范大学信息管理学院,湖北武汉430079

出　　处：《经济与管理》2019年第2期32-37,共6页Economy and Management

基　　金：衡阳市社会科学基金项目[2016B(11)011];湖南省教育厅科研项目(17C0451)

摘　　要：大数据时代,电子商务企业为用户提供个性化产品的同时还面临着隐私保护问题。企业隐私保护策略不仅会影响用户的购买决策,也会影响竞争对手企业的隐私保护策略,因此,企业的隐私保护策略对企业自身利益的实现和整体网络安全环境的营造都具有重要意义。通过建立企业之间隐私保护竞争的主从博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法求解得到两个企业隐私保护力度的均衡解,并用数值演示的方式揭示两个企业投资力度的变化过程。研究表明:企业的隐私保护力度不仅受到其竞争对手企业的影响,而且成本价值系数、愿意购买个性化产品的用户比例都会对企业的隐私保护力度产生影响。In the era of large data,e-commerce enterprises provide users with personalized products and face the problem of privacy protection at the same time. Privacy protection strategies of the enterprise will be affected by not only the users’ purchase decisions,but also the privacy protection strategies of the competitors. The enterprises’ privacy protection strategies are of great significance to the realization of the enterprises’ own interests as well as the construction of the overall network security environment. This paper establishes a master-slave game model of privacy protection competition between enterprises,obtains the equilibrium solution of privacy protection intensity of two enterprises by solving by backward induction method,and reveals the change process of investment intensity of two enterprises by means of numerical demonstration. Research shows that the privacy protection intensity of an enterprise is not only influenced by its competitors,but also by the costvalue coefficient and the proportion of users who are willing to buy personalized products.

关 键 词：个性化电子商务 隐私保护力度 主从博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] C93[经济管理—国民经济]