高管持股促进企业研发投资了么?——基于套现行为视角的观察  

Does Executive Stock Ownership Promote Corporate R&D Investment?A Study based on Insider Trading Behavior

作　　者：邵剑兵[1] 聂磊 李威 SHAO Jian-bing;NIE Lei;LI Wei(Business School, Liaoning University, Shenyang 110036, China;Country Garden Real Estate Company Shenyang Branch, Shenyang 110000, China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学商学院,沈阳110036 [2]沈阳市碧桂园房地产开发有限公司,沈阳110000

出　　处：《商业研究》2019年第3期124-132,共9页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"大数据情境下国有企业高管层激励与监管动态耦合研究";项目编号:18BGL081;辽宁省经济社会研究发展项目"辽宁省国有企业高管层激励与监管双重机制动态耦合研究";项目编号:2018lslktyb-062

摘　　要：高管股权激励不仅有利于解决第一类代理问题,而且对企业研发投资活动也有促进作用(利益协同效应),被视为保持企业竞争优势的重要途径。本文选择高管套现这个特殊情境,从静态和动态双重视角观察投资迎合行为对利益协同效应的影响。研究发现,发生高管套现的上市公司,企业研发投资的增加是投资迎合效应和利益协同效应的共同作用结果,两种效应之间存在着一定的互补关系。值得注意的是,套现情境下增强的利益协同效应大大提升了企业非效率投资。因而,企业在实施股权激励机制的时候不应当忽视高管自利动机对研发投资活动的影响。Executive equity incentive is an indispensable mechanism to eliminate the agency problem, and the effect of executive stock ownership on the promotion of R&D investment(interest cooperation) is regarded as an important way to keep the competitive advantage of enterprises. This paper chooses the special situation of executive cash, and observes the effect of the investment catering on interest cooperation effect from static and dynamic double visual angle. The conclusion is that the increase of R&D investment in listed corporation which executives cashed is the result of the effect of investment catering and the interest cooperation, and there is a certain complementary relationship between the two effects. It is worth noting that, under the situation of executives′ cashing behavior, enhanced synergy of interests led to the inefficient investment of enterprises. Therefore, enterprise should not ignore the influence of executive self motivation on R&D investment activities in the implementation of equity incentive mechanism.

关 键 词：投资迎合 利益协同 高管持股 企业研发投入 创业板 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]