两个制造商量子Stackelberg博弈  

Two Manufacturers Quantum Stackelberg Game

作　　者：许民利[1] 马宏涛 简惠云[1] Xu Minli;Ma Hongtao;Jian Huiyun(Business School,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2019年第4期43-49,共7页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"行为视角下再制造产业链协调发展研究"(项目编号:14BGL196)

摘　　要：两制造商生产同质产品供应同一市场,他们在市场中的地位不同,跟随型企业根据领导型企业的产量确定自身产量。由经典Stackelberg博弈可知,跟随型企业处于竞争劣势。本文通过量子博弈发现,当博弈双方的策略纠缠程度从0增加至π/2时,跟随型企业与领导型企业之间的博弈均衡产量与均衡收益的差距减少;当纠缠程度达到π/2时均衡结果消失,量子Stackelberg博弈消失,退化成一般量子博弈,双方可能达到"双赢"局面。因此,跟随型企业应该增强与领导型企业的纠缠程度,以减少均衡产量与均衡收益的差距。双方的最优策略是达到完全纠缠程度,如此可能实现双赢。The two manufacturers produce homogeneous products to supply the same market.Their positions in the market are different,and follow-up companies determine their own output based on the output of leading enterprises.According to the classic Stackelberg game,follow-up companies are at a competitive disadvantage.However,we find through quantum games that when the degree of entanglement between the two sides of the game increases from zero,the gap between game-balanced output and equilibrium returns between follow-up firms and leading firms decreases;when the degree of entanglement reaches,equilibrium results disappear.The quantum Stackelberg game disappears and degenerates into a general quantum game,then both sides may reach a“win-win”situation.Therefore,follow-up companies should increase the degree of entanglement with leading companies to reduce the gap between balanced production and balanced returns.The best strategy for both sides is to achieve complete entanglement.It is possible to achieve a win-win situation.

关 键 词：两制造商竞争 STACKELBERG博弈 量子Stackelberg博弈 先动优势 完全纠缠策略 利益最大化 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]