零售商提供延保服务和故障率信息不对称的供应链契约设计  

Commission Contract Design in Product Service Supply Chain under Retailer Sales Extend Warranty under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：寇军 KOU Jun(Economics and Management School of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Chongqing 400065,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆邮电大学经济管理学院,重庆400065

出　　处：《四川文理学院学报》2019年第2期79-87,共9页Sichuan University of Arts and Science Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"面向产品服务系统的供应链运作优化与协调"(71272086);重庆市社会科学规划项目"考虑延保服务销售的产品服务供应链质量与价格决策"(2018BS70);重庆邮电大学社会科学基金重点项目"供应链延保服务定价策略与企业合作机制研究"(K2018-88);重庆邮电大学博士启动基金;人才引进基金"考虑延保服务的供应链企业定价策略与合作机制研究"(K2018-77)

摘　　要：针对一个制造商和一个零售商构成的产品服务供应链,考虑零售商销售并提供延保服务,产品故障率为零售商私有信息.建立了制造商与零售商之间的委托代理模型,研究了制造商的契约设计问题,分析了产品生产成本、故障率类型预期等因素对均衡结果的影响及不同信息情形下制造商、零售商和产品服务供应链系统利润的差异.研究结果显示:信息不对称不一定会降低供应链系统绩效,不同产品故障率类型下制造商需要调整不同的激励策略.此外,产品生产成本、制造商对故障率的预期等均会对激励契约产生影响.最后通过数值算例进一步分析了不同信息条件下产品故障率等参数对合作契约和制造商、零售商期望利润的影响.Focused on the product service supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacture,which the retailer sales extend warranty and the failure rate for its private information,the optimal commission contract is proposed under asymmetric information.We analyses the impact of different factors such as the production cost,the failure rate and analyze the effect/impact of asymmetric information on the retailer and the manufacture's profit.The results show that,the purpose of the commission contract designed by the manufacture is different with the different failure rate.Asymmetric information leads to the distortion of the commission contract parameters.In addition,the production cost,the expected failure rate of the manufacturer will have an effect on the incentive contract.A numerical example to further analyze the effects of different information with the product failure rate and other parameters on the cooperation contract and the expected profit of manufacturers and retailers is carried out.

关 键 词：信息不对称 延保服务 故障率 契约设计 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]