从马克思“类本质”视角看孟子的“性善论”  

Studies on Mencius' Theory of “Human Nature Is Good” from the Perspective of Marx's “Human Categorical Nature”

作　　者：闫阳 YAN Yang(School of Philosophy,Beijing Normal University,Beijing,China 100875)

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学哲学院,北京1008751

出　　处：《温州大学学报（社会科学版）》2019年第2期27-32,共6页Journal of Wenzhou University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L17BZX003)

摘　　要：马克思认为,人首先作为类存在物而存在。因而对人性的考察需在"类"的范畴中进行。人的"类本质"应当在现实的、具体的生命活动中去理解。在现有的、有生命的"类"的意义上而言,作为"类本质"的人的生命活动天然地趋向于实现自身的自觉与自由。从马克思这一理论视角看,孟子"性善论"思想中的"心所同然""良知良能""反身而诚"等内容颇有"类存在""生命活动"与"自觉自由"的意味。Marx considered, human beings existed as a categorical existence first of all. Therefore, the investigation of human nature needs to be carried out in the scope of "category". The categorical nature of human beings is supposed to comprehend in the realistic and concrete life activities. As far as the existing and living "category" is concerned, the human’s life activities as "categorical nature" naturally tend to realize their self-awareness and freedom. From the perspective of Marx’s "Human Categorical Nature", these concepts like "sameness of our minds","innate knowledge and ability instinct" and "sincerity and earnestness", which are included in the Mencius’ theory of "human nature is good", are very similar to the meaning of "categorical existence","life activities" and "consciousness & freedom".

关 键 词：马克思 类本质 孟子 性善论 

分 类 号：B27[哲学宗教—中国哲学]