股权激励合约会影响企业资本结构动态调整吗?  

Do Equity Incentive Contracts Affect the Dynamic Adjustment of Capital Structure?

作　　者：侯丽[1] 钟田丽[1] 李佳宁 HOU Li;ZHONG Tian-li;LI Jia-ning(School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《预测》2019年第2期59-67,共9页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71150002)

摘　　要：本文依据沪深A股上市公司的面板数据,将倾向得分匹配和多元回归方法相结合,检验管理层股权激励合约及其条款对资本结构动态调整的影响。研究发现:企业实施股权激励合约对资本结构动态调整具有正向影响;合约设计的高标准行权条件、较长有效期、较强激励力度以及限制性股票激励方式等条款促进了资本结构趋向目标水平调整。进一步研究表明,企业产权性质和外部治理机制影响股权激励合约的有效性,具体表现为:相对于国有企业,民营企业实施股权激励合约对资本结构调整的影响显著有效;稳定型机构投资者持股和产品市场竞争治理机制在股权激励合约优化资本结构决策方面存在“替代”和“互补”效应。Based on the panel data of firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange, this paper empirically tests the impact of management equity incentive contracts on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure by adopting a combination of PSM and multiple regression method. The research finds that the implementation of equity incentive contracts has a positive impact on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure. Equity incentives like stricter vesting condition, or longer period of validity, or higher incentive intensity, or restricted stock, help to promote the adjustment of capital structure to the target level. Further research shows that firm ownership and external governance affect the effectiveness of equity incentive contracts. The effect of equity incentive contracts on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure in private enterprises is significant instead of in state-owned enterprises. The stable institutional investor’s shareholding and product market competition governance mechanism and equity incentive contracts have a substitutive and complementary effect on optimizing capital structure decisions respectively.

关 键 词：股权激励合约 资本结构动态调整 产权性质 稳定型机构投资者持股 产品市场竞争 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]