电子商务下风险规避制造商对供应链决策策略的影响研究  

Influences of a risk-averse manufacturer on decision policies in supply chains under e-commence

作　　者：李波[1] 王汝锋 陈蔚淳 LI Bo;WANG Ru-feng;CHEN Wei-chun(College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China)

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2019年第2期173-179,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472133)

摘　　要：考虑一个风险规避制造商和一个风险中性零售商组成的双渠道供应链,针对消费者对实体渠道和网络渠道偏好的不同,建立了Stackelberg博弈的定价策略模型。通过和供应链成员完全风险中性下的均衡结果比较,发现风险规避时制造商追求高利润必定会承担高风险,且当其风险管控因子在一定范围内时,有两个最优批发价使得制造商的利润相同。通过分析可知:制造商选择低定价对零售商、消费者及供应链整体利润均有利,但对其渠道的控制力减弱。数值实验表明,当消费者对实体渠道的忠诚度一定时,存在合适的风险管控因子,使得零售商的利润和供应链总利润达到最优。当消费者对实体渠道的忠诚度增加时,同制造商风险中性时相比较,零售商的最优利润和供应链最优总利润增幅增大。With the development of electronic commerce, an increasing number of manufacturers open their e-channels in addition to the traditional retail channels, named as the manufacturer’s dual-channel. On the one hand, the manufacturer’s e-channel will compete with the traditional retail channel. On the other hand, consumers can purchase products from different channels, which enable consumers to have different preference to e-channel and retail channel. The competition between different channels and consumers’ preference for different channels increase the volatility of market demand. Thus, the partners of the dual-channel supply chain need to aware of the risk and adopt risk-aversion behavior when they make the decisions. To the best of our knowledge, very little literature studies the risk-aversion behavior of members in the dual-channel supply chain, especially considering the manufacturer’s risk-aversion behavior.To close the research gap, this paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain which consists of one risk-averse manufacturer as a leader and one risk-neutral retailer as a follower. The risk aversion of the manufacturer is measured by the mean-variance method and based on consumers’ channel preferences.Consumers are classified into two types: grocery shoppers and Internet shoppers. Using the Stackelberg game theoretic analysis, we examine the optimal equilibrium pricing under the dual-channel model. A supply chain in which the manufacturer is risk neutral is used as a comparison benchmark.Furthermore, comparisons are made between the proposed model and the benchmark concerning the price, demand, the manufacturer’s channel control,the agents’ profits, and the whole supply chain. Moreover, this study discusses the impacts of the risk control factor on price, demand, the manufacturer’s channel control, individual agents’ profits, and the supply chain. Finally, we investigate the effect of customer loyalty to the physical channel(the proportion of the grocery shoppers) on the agents’ profi

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 风险规避行为 均值-方差方法 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F272.3[经济管理—国民经济]