环境邻避的冲突原理及其超越——以双重博弈结构为分析框架  

CAUSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL NIMBY CONFLICTS AND SOLUTIONS:WITH DUAL-GAME STRUCTURE AS AN ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

作　　者：郭少青 GUO Shaoqing

机构地区：[1]深圳大学城市治理研究院

出　　处：《城市规划》2019年第2期109-118,共10页City Planning Review

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金项目"智慧城市建设中环境治理的制度创新研究"(16YJC820008);深圳大学人文社科青年教师扶持基金项目"我国环境邻避冲突的法律治理"(17QNFC04)

摘　　要：由于垃圾焚烧厂的建设而引发的环境邻避冲突频频,其深层次原因是在双重博弈结构中,行政科层对主政官员形成强激励,而辖区内公众和邻避项目的中标企业对其形成弱激励,因此对地方主政官员的行为偏好产生影响,由此使得邻避冲突的治理陷入了"封闭式决策"和"叫停式补救"的怪圈。本文提出3条主要路径,优化当前的环境邻避冲突的治理,必须从根源性的治理改革做起:走向"协商民主模式"的环境公共决策机制;加强政府信息能力建设;完善环境公益诉讼制度。The NIMBY conflicts caused by the construction of garbage incineration plants frequently occur.This paper proposes that the main reason is the dual-game structure.In the dual games,the administrative departments form a strong incentive for chief officials,while the public and the enterprises winning the bidding of NIMBY projects in the jurisdiction form a weak incentive for the officials,which thus affect the behaviors of local officials.Consequently,the governance over NIMBY conflicts falls into a weird cycle characterized by "closed decision-making" and"call-off remediation".To optimize the governance of such conflicts,this paper puts forward three paths: reforming the decision-making mechanism of the government,promoting the government’s ability in information disposal,and improving the public interest litigation system concerning environmental issues.

关 键 词：双重博弈结构 激励机制 邻避冲突 公众参与 

分 类 号：TU984[建筑科学—城市规划与设计] D630[政治法律—政治学]