供应商参与新产品开发中供应商甄别机制研究  

Research on Supplier Selection Mechanism in Supplier's Involvement in New Product Development

作　　者：熊艳 任文举 张同建[2] 李文[2] XIONG Yan;REN Wenju;ZHANG Tongjian;LI Wen(Economics and Management School, Leshan Normal College, Leshan, Sichuan 614004;Management School, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013)

机构地区：[1]乐山师范学院经济与管理学院,四川乐山614004 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《绵阳师范学院学报》2019年第4期24-29,51,共7页Journal of Mianyang Teachers＇ College

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"产学研合作虚拟企业的公司治理机制研究"(15BGL093)

摘　　要：供应商参与新产品开发是我国企业从西方引入的一种重要的新产品开发模式,但在我国企业中长期处于不成功状态。由于信息不对称,制造商对供应商识别与判断的能力严重不足,为新产品开发带来较大的危害。供应商参与新产品开发的完全但不完美信息动态博弈机制的分析,揭示了不同条件下制造商对供应商的微观甄别机理,提出了制造商对供应商选择和判断的改进策略,从而推进我国企业供应商参与新产品开发的发展。The supplier involvement in new product development is an important new product development mode of enterprises in China, which is introduced from the west, but is not successful in the long-term enterprise in our country. Because of the information asymmetry, the identifying and judging capacity of manufacturer to supplier is seriously lower, which bring great harm for the new product development. The analysis of dynamic games mechanism of complete but imperfect information about supplier involvement in new product development of reveals the microscopic screening mechanism of manufacturer to supplier under different conditions,and proposes the improvement strategy of selection and judgment of manufacturer to supplier, so as to promote the development of the supplier involvement in new product Development in our enterprise.

关 键 词：供应商参与新产品开发 完全但不完美信息动态博弈 制造商 违约成本 双重价格 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]